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We provide a new perspective on the impact of unauthorized copying and copy
levies on artistic creation. Our analysis emphasizes three important aspects of
artistic markets: the predominance of superstars, the dynamics of talent sorting,
and the importance of promotion expenditures. In the short run, piracy reduces
superstars’ earnings and market share, and increases the number of niche and
young artists. From a dynamic perspective, piracy may help more young artists
start their careers, thereby increasing the number of highly talented artists in the
long run. The long run impact on artistic creation of levies on copy equipment
may crucially depend on whether their yields primarily accrue to superstars or
are allocated to help young artists.
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11 Introduction
The music industry and other artistic markets are experiencing profound changes as a
result of digital recording, Internet ﬁle-sharing, and new electronic devices. This has
launched a far-reaching debate on the consequences of the new technologies for artistic
creation and the possible need to redeﬁne intellectual property rights.
According to some individuals and companies in the artistic industry, ﬁle sharing
and unauthorized copying is causing huge losses to artistic creators and producers, and
will have a very negative impact on artistic creation in the long run.1 They have asked
for controls and restrictions on the use of the Internet for copying, as well as for levies
on copy equipment. Levies would provide compensation for unauthorized copying and
restore incentives for artistic creation. These arguments have led many countries in
Europe and other parts of the world to implement taxes and levies on copy equipment
and electronic devices (see Table 1 for a sample of these new taxes). In general, the
revenues from these levies are allocated across copyright holders, creators, performers,
and publishers according to their legal sales.
Others argue that current copyrights are already excessive in most Western coun-
tries and that their yields mostly accrue to a relatively small number of superstars and
artistic ﬁrms that obtain economic rents.2 The new communication technologies are
helping the careers of young and niche artists and may reduce the concentration of
1There is controversy, however, over the real eﬀect of ﬁle sharing and unauthorized copying on
music sales. Rob and Waldfogel (2006) and Zentner (2006) ﬁnd some negative eﬀect on sales, whereas
Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf (2007) ﬁnds no eﬀect at all. Also, the fall in the value of total sales in
recorded music has not always been accompanied by a fall in the number of units sold. For example,
according to recording industry statistics, total sales in recorded music in the UK fell by about 10-
percent between 2002 and 2006, but the number of CDs sold this last year was still higher than in 2002:
164.4 millions (source: IFPI). Moreover, other sources of revenues such as concerts and merchandising
seem to be soaring. For example, concert-ticket sales in North America increased from $1.7 billions
in 2000 to $3.1 billions in 2006 (source: Pollstar).
2The copyright term in the United States is the life of the author plus 70 years. See Akerloﬀ et al.
(2002) for arguments against the last extension in the US that was approved in 1998, and Kretschmer
et al. (2008) for arguments against the current proposed extension in the European Union. See Varian
(2005) for a survey on the general issues relating to copyrights.
2s a l e si na r t i s t i cm a r k e t s . 3 Restrictions on ﬁle sharing and the implementation of levies
on copy equipment may revert this process and harm the general public.
Here, we are interested in some speciﬁc questions. May ﬁle sharing and copying
really favor niche and young artists? Can this be done without hampering high-quality
artistic creation in the long run? Can ﬁle sharing and copying even enhance high-
quality creation? This paper analyzes the short and long run consequences of unau-
thorized copying for artistic creation, and the eﬀects of implementing diﬀerent types
of copy levies. The paper focuses on the interaction between copying and three key
aspects of artistic markets that have largely been neglected by the conventional analy-
sis of intellectual property. These aspects are the predominance of superstars, the
importance of promotion expenditures, and the dynamics of talent sorting.
These three aspects of artistic markets can be brieﬂy explained as follows. First,
artistic creation is intensive in an innate input: talent. Rosen (1981) showed that
this factor, combined with the scale economies associated with the joint consumption
of artistic goods, leads to the superstar phenomenon: concentration of output and
extremely large rewards for the most talented artists.4 Second, promotion costs are
3Anderson (2004) has pointed out an interesting way the new ICTs are raising the opportunities
for the long tail of niche and young artists. By the long tail, Anderson (2004) refers to the thin part
of the distribution of sales, to distinguish it from the head or thick part that concentrates most sales.
For example, 20% of goods tend to account for more than 80% of sales in most industries. According
to Anderson, the number of goods that can be provided in conventional brick-and-mortar stores is
constrained by shelf space, storage costs, and the size of the local market. In contrast, internet stores
of digital products do not have those constraints. As a result, online stores do not need to restrict
their supply to the most popular hits, but can also provide access to the large tail of niche and young
artists. Brynjolfsson et al.(2003) found that 30% to 40% of Amazon book sales are titles that would
not normally be found in brick-and-mortar stores. See also Brynjolfsson et al. (2007) on how Internet
sales exhibit signiﬁcantly less concentration than traditional sales.
4Several papers provide evidence of the strong concentration of sales in the market for popular
music. See Rothenbuhler and Dimmick (1982), Crain and Tollison (2002), and Krueger (2005), among
others. Krueger (2005), for example, reports that in 2003 the top 1% of artists obtained 56% of
concert revenues, and that the top 5% took in 84%. Similarly, there is evidence of the extremely
skewed distribution of copyright yields across artists, even if data about these earnings are not easily
accessible (they are privately held by collecting societies). For example, Kretschmer and Hardwick
(2007) report data on the distribution of payments in 1994 by the UK Performing Right Society. This
3a crucial ingredient in explaining the demand for artistic products and greatly aﬀect
the division of market shares between superstars and niche as well as young artists.5
Third, there is a dynamic positive link between the current number of young artists
and the future number of highly talented superstars. As pointed out by MacDonald
(1988), talent and charisma are not easily detected. As a consequence, the condition
for having a large number of highly talented artists in the future is to have many young
artists starting an artistic career today (even though most of them will not succeed).6
Thus, our analysis makes an explicit distinction between superstars (or high-type
artists) on the one hand, and niche and young artists (or low-type artists) on the
other. First, we analyze the short run equilibrium of artistic markets. In the short
run, the number of superstars is exogenously given whereas there is free entry into the
sub-market of niche and young artists. Piracy reduces superstars’ earnings and the
incentives to invest in their promotion. This tends to increase the market share and
the number of niche and young artists, thereby raising artistic diversity.
Second, we consider the dynamics of the market and its long run equilibrium. We
build a simple overlapping-generations model of artists where only a fraction of young
artists starting the artistic career show talent and become superstars later in their
careers. The number of superstars is then endogenous. Piracy helps more young
artists start their careers, which in turn increases the number of highly talented artists
in the long run.
Third, we consider policy. We compare the consequences of diﬀerent levies on copy
equipment and analyze alternative schemes for allocating their yields. We ﬁnd that
taxes on copying may hinder the promotion of niche and young artists, and hamper
society distributed £20,350,000 among 15,500 writers for the public performance and broadcasting of
their works. The top 9.3% of writers earned 81.07% of the total. Ten composers earned more than
£100,000, whereas 53.1% of the composers earned less than £100. These authors’ estimations for
the period 2004-2005 show similar results. For evidence on superstars’ rents in the motion picture
industry see Chisholm (2004).
5For example, Peitz and Waelbroeck (2004) cite several sources showing that marketing and pro-
motion are the main costs of making and selling a recorded CD.
6See Terviö (2009) for a general analysis of the market failure in discovering talent and how this
leads to an ineﬃciently low output and higher earnings for known talents.
4artistic creation in the long run. Moreover, the most common policy followed by
Western countries of distributing levy yields in proportion to market sales strongly
favors superstars. This increases the incentives to promote superstars, thereby fuelling
market concentration again, which in turn reduces artistic diversity in the short run
as well as high-quality artistic creation in the long run.7 We ﬁnd that artistic creation
can be stimulated more eﬀectively in the short as well as in the long run by allocating
levy yields using non-linear (in sales) schemes that strongly favor young artists.
A growing economic literature is gradually addressing the eﬀects of the new infor-
mation and copying technologies on artistic markets and other industries (see Peitz
and Waelbroeck, 2006, for a survey). Alcalá and González-Maestre (2008) and Zhang
(2002) are the closest papers to this one. Alcalá and González-Maestre (2008) build
a model with the three aspects of artistic markets emphasized here and analyze the
optimal length of the copyright term. Nonetheless, they do not consider the possibility
of unauthorized copying and do not explore its consequences. Zhang (2002) considers
the role of promotion costs and copying in artistic markets in a duopoly model where
digital copies help reduce the distortionary eﬀects of the large-audience artist’s persua-
sive advertising. However, in Zhang (2002)’s model there is no entry to the low-type
sub-market, nor to the high-type artistic sub-market. Contrarily, analyzing entry in
each of these markets is crucial in our investigation of how unauthorized copying and
copy levies may aﬀect artistic creation in the short and in the long run.8
Two ﬁnal notes on the scope and the limitations of the paper. First, the paper is
mostly motivated by the music and recording market. However, similar mechanisms
are present in most activities where creative work is important and can be easily copied,
as in movies and books. Second, a key assumption throughout the paper is that su-
perstars’ earnings are above their opportunity cost; i.e., they obtain rents. This seems
7Moreover, as long as not all the equipment subject to copy levies is used for copying artistic
material (as it happens with many data CDs, hard disks, pen drives, etc.), this scheme for allocating
copy levies may involve a transfer of resources from the rest of the economy to superstars.
8Also, previous papers such as Gayer and Shy (2003) and Kinokuni (2005) have analyzed the eﬀects
of copy levies on technological markets. However, to the extent of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper
analyzing the eﬀect of these levies on artistic creation.
5a reasonable hypothesis, which is motivated by the empirical evidence on the concen-
tration of market share and revenues by superstars. Moreover, the dynamic model in
Section 3, where the number of superstars is endogenized, shows that superstars can
indeed obtain rents in equilibrium (even if there is free entry to the artistic market as
young artists and all talented young artists become superstars later in their careers).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the static version of
the model and analyzes the short run equilibrium of artistic markets with and without
piracy. Section 3 sets the dynamic version of the model and investigates the long run
impact of copying on artistic creation. Section 4 considers diﬀerent types of levies on
copy equipment and analyzes their impact on artistic creation. Section 5 concludes.
2 Superstars and Niche Artists: the Short Run
In this section, we set the static version of our model and analyze the short equilibrium
of artistic markets. Artists may be either high-type (superstars) or low-type (niche and
young artists). In the short run, the number of high-type artists is exogenous, whereas
there is free entry to the low-type artists’ sub-market. The exogeneity of the number
of high-type artists reﬂects the idea that the set of superstars changes with lower
frequency than the set of niche and young artists. The number of high-type artists is
endogenized in the dynamic model in Section 3 where we analyze artistic markets in
the long run.
Each active artist creates a single artistic good (such as a song, novel, movie, etc.).
Therefore, artistic creation is proportional to the number of artists, though we may
distinguish between high-quality artistic creation (which results from high-type artists’
work) and low-quality artistic creation (which results from low-type artists’ work).
Being active as an artist involves opportunity costs Fl for low-type artists and F h for
high-type artists.9 As discussed in the Introduction, we assume throughout the paper
9Fl and Fh can be interpreted as the ﬁxed cost of creating a low- and a high-type artistic good,
respectively. In addition to including the artist’s time opportunity cost, it can be seen as also including
the costs of other inputs needed for creation (e.g., recording or ﬁlming equipment). It may be realistic
to assume Fh >Fl.
6that superstars’ earnings are above their opportunity cost Fh; i.e., they obtain rents.
Once an artistic good is created, it can then be inﬁnitely reproduced at some
constant marginal cost. Consumers can consume artistic goods by buying original re-
productions (originals for short), which pay copyrights, or unauthorized copies (copies
for short), which do not. We ﬁrst analyze artistic markets when piracy does not exist;
i.e., individuals can only consume artistic goods by buying originals. Then, we intro-
duce piracy and consider the case where all artists are copied. We end this section by
summarily analyzing all possible intermediate cases where superstars are aﬀected by
copying but low-type artists are not.
2.1 The Model Without Piracy
There is a measure-one continuum of consumers who spend an amount S of money on
artistic goods. The representative consumer solves the following utility maximization
problem:




where x (respectively, y) is consumption of superstars’ originals (resp., low-type artists’
originals) and ph (resp., pl) is their price.10 Superstars’ market share a is endogenous. It
positively depends on the number of superstars as well as on their total expenditures
on promotion and marketing relative to market size. Only high-type artists enjoy
promotion and marketing expenditures, which may be thought to be managed by
competitive artistic promotion ﬁrms.11 Speciﬁcally, high-type artists’ market share a
10See Alcalá and González-Maestre (2008) for how this setting can be framed into a two-stage
budgeting model with a general consumption good in addition to artistic goods.
11The relationship between creators and artistic ﬁrms (such as labels and publishers) are regulated
by contracts that can make artistic ﬁrms the main beneﬁciaries of stronger copyright protection. The
potential conﬂict of interest between creators and artistic ﬁrms has been analyzed in Gayer and Shy
(2006). Here we simplify this issue by assuming that promotion ﬁrms are perfectly competitive or,
alternatively, by considering each superstar in the model to be a vertically integrated structure of a
high-type artist and an artistic promotion ﬁrm.





Ai,A i ≥ 0,i =1 ,2,..,n ; (2)
where Ai is artist i’s promotion expenditures, n (n ≥ 2) is the number of high-type
artists, and β and γ are exogenous parameters, 1 >β>0,γ >1.12 Thus, superstars
would capture all the market if and only if their total promotion expenditure A is
inﬁnite.
Competition takes place according to the following multistage game:
Stage 1: Each high-type artist chooses simultaneously and independently her level
of Ai.
Stage 2: Each potential low-type artist decides whether to enter and be active in
t h el o w - t y p ea r t i s t i cs u b - m a r k e t .A sn o t e d ,e n t r yi n v o l v e saﬁxed opportunity cost F l.
Stage 3: Firms compete à la Cournot.
Let us consider the Cournot-Nash equilibrium at Stage 3. Standard calculations
show that inverse demand functions are given by ph = aS/x and pl =( 1− a)S/y.






− cxi − Ai − F
h,i =1 ,2,...,n.
where xi is artist i’s sales and c is the constant marginal cost of reproducing origi-
nals, which is assumed to be the same for all artists. Cournot equilibrium ﬁrst order














n2 − Ai − F
h. (3)
12A ﬁrm’s advertising tends to increase both the demand for that ﬁrm’s good and the overall demand
for the type of good being advertised. As a result, advertising increases the share of this type of good in
consumers’ expenditure (Sutton, 1991). In our formulation we model advertising as a public good for
high-type agents, ignoring the competitive eﬀects of advertising within high-type agents and focussing
on the aggregate interactions between the low-type and the high-type sub-markets. Moreover, we do
not entertain any assumption on whether advertising is informative or merely persuasive, but simply
assume that it is eﬀective in stimulating demand.
8To obtain the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game, we can rewrite high-type





n2 − Ai − F
h,i =1 ,2,...,n.
Maximizing with respect to Ai yields the equilibrium value of a:
βe−γnA/S
n
γ − 1=0 → a =1− n/γ. (4)
Inequality n<β γmust hold to insure Ai > 0. We assume that γ is always high enough
to guarantee this condition. Moreover, πh
i ≥ F h requires n to be small enough or S
large enough.






− cyj − F
l ; j =1 ,2,...,m.
Where yj is artist j’s sales. Cournot equilibrium in the low-type sub-market yields the



























2.2 The Impact of Piracy
We now introduce piracy: consumers can obtain unauthorized copies of artistic goods
at an exogenous cost pc. Market equilibrium may be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent depending
on the level of pc with respect to the parameters determining ph and pl.D i ﬀerent cases
lead to diﬀerent combinations of copies of superstars’ work and niche artists’ work
being blockaded, deterred, or accommodated. In this subsection we assume that pc is
low enough such that in equilibrium pc <p l ≤ ph. As a result, all artists are pirated.
This case may seem the most relevant one from the empirical point of view and is
9likely to make the strongest case against piracy. In the next subsection, we brieﬂy
characterize the other possible cases (only superstars are copied, copying is deterred,
etc.), which are analyzed in detail in the Appendix.
There is a great heterogeneity across consumers with respect to consuming originals
or unauthorized copies. For example, casual observation suggests that youngsters tend
to consume copies relatively more often than other population groups. This can easily
be explained in terms of consumer heterogeneity across a large set of parameters: moral
restraints on copying (since people may ﬁnd copying to be immoral), internet skills,
opportunity costs of the time needed to search and download ﬁles from the internet,
valuations for quality (as long as originals have higher quality), valuations for non-
digital components that may be bundled with the digital product (such as the CD
or DVD case with pictures, artwork, lyrics, information, etc.), and risk aversion with
respect to the possibility of infecting the computer with viruses, adware and spyware.13
Consumer heterogeneity has been considered by the theoretical literature in diﬀerent
ways (see Peitz and Waelbroeck, 2006). In this paper, we consider a continuum of
consumers with diﬀerent (constant) marginal rates of substitution υ between copies
and originals. The consumer problem is now recasted as:






where zx is consumption of copies of superstars’ work and zy i st h es a m ef o rl o w -
type artists’ work. Assuming that υ is uniformly distributed across individuals in
the interval [0,1],t h ef r a c t i o nδ of individuals that buy originals in the case of high-
type goods is δ = pc/ph (provided that pc <p h; otherwise, δ =1 ). The remaining
fraction 1 − δ consume copies. Hence, if pc <p h, the demand for high-type originals
is x = pcaS/(ph)2. Similarly, if pc <p l, the demand for low-type artists’ originals is
y = pc(1 − a)S/(pl)2 (otherwise, their demand is y =( 1− a)S/pl as in the previous
subsection). Clearly, demand is more elastic as a result of competition from copies.
13The empirical work cited in the Introduction ﬁnding that ﬁle sharing in the Internet has a small
or null eﬀect on legal sales suggests that a large share of the population has a strong preference for
originals.
10As already indicated, in this subsection we assume that pc is low enough such that
in equilibrium pc <p l ≤ ph. Hence, all artists’ work is pirated (although not all
consumers buy copies). Thus, using the corresponding demand function, high-type
originals’ price and sales are ph = 2n




c2 , respectively. Thus,
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h.









−γnA/S) − Ai − F
h,i =1 ,2,...,n. (8)



















In turn, low-type artists’ proﬁt maximization conditional on the demand when their
work is pirated (i.e., when pc <p l), yields equilibrium price pl = 2m
2m−1c and per artist




4m3 . Then, using the free entry condition, we obtain the












Comparing (6) with (10) shows that mc >m ∗ if and only if mc >n ,w h i c hi st a k e nf o r
granted.
Proposition 1 Consider the short run equilibrium where the number of superstars is
given and parameters are such that all artists’ work is pirated. The number of niche
and young artists in the market is larger with piracy than if piracy could be completely
prevented.
The intuition for this result is that superstars’ promotion expenditures act as a
barrier to entry against low-type artists. Copying reduces the proﬁtability of superstars’
11promotion costs (compare (9) with (4)), thereby leaving a larger market share for low-
type artists.14 Copying also brings about a reduction in the prices of both high- and
low-type artistic goods that beneﬁtc o n s u m e r s . 15
2.3 The General Case: From Blockaded Copying to Accom-
modation
In general, there are several possible cases on the value of pc with respect to (the
equilibrium levels of) ph and pl. This leads to diﬀerent characteristics of equilibrium.
We brieﬂy describe here the diﬀerent cases and refer to the Appendix for a detailed
analysis. Denote by ph the price of high-type originals that was obtained in Subsection
2.1 for the case of no piracy, ph ≡ n
n−1c,a n db yph the price of high-type originals
when high-type work is copied, which was computed in Subsection 2.2: ph ≡ 2n
2n−1c.
Similarly, denote by pl the price of low-type work when its market is not aﬀected by
piracy and by pl its price when low-type work is copied. The possible cases depending
on the exogenous level of pc are:16
14Empirical evidence regarding the market for rock concerts seems to be consistent with the model’s
prediction of decreasing superstars’ market share. According to Pollstar (an industry trade magazine),
ticket revenues from concerts in North America in 2007 rose to $3.9 billion, which represents about 8%
increase over 2006 with $3.6 billion and the ninth consecutive year with increasing revenues. However,
the top 20 tours combined saw a 15% decline in ticket revenues compared with the top 20 tours from
2006.
15The eﬀect of copying on CD prices has been openly recognized by the Recording Industry Asso-
ciation of America. See RIAA (2007).
16See the Appendix, where it is also shown that pl = m
m−1c and pl ≡ 2m
2m−1c. It could also be the
case that ph ≯ pl. In such a case, the analysis is somewhat simpler since case (iii) is replaced by
















These cases correspond to (i) all copies are blockaded, (ii) all copies are deterred,
(iii) copies of superstars’ work are accommodated whereas copies of low-type work are
blockaded, (iv) copies of superstars’ work are accommodated whereas copies of low-
type artists’ work are deterred, (v) copies of superstars’ work as well as of low-type
artists’ work are accommodated. Note that the analysis in the previous subsection
corresponds to this last case.
Figure 1 depicts m as a function of pc, following the analysis in the Appendix.
The key result is that m is larger in all cases where the market is aﬀected by piracy
(cases (ii) to (v))t h a nw h e ni ti sn o ta ﬀected (case (i)). The following proposition
characterizes m as a function of pc along the ﬁve cases.
Proposition 2 Consider the short run when the number of superstars is given. The
number of niche and young artists m is a continuous function of pc, which is character-
ized as follows. There is a critical value po < ph that maximizes m.T h i sv a l u epo is the
lowest level pc such that superstars are pirated but low-type artists are not aﬀected by
piracy, which occurs for pc = pl.F o rpc >p o, m is monotonically decreasing, whereas
for pc <p o, m is monotonically increasing. Moreover, m is constant for small values
of pc such that all artists are copied, as well as for values such that none is copied. In
all cases, the number of niche and young artists is larger when the market is aﬀected
by piracy than when it is not.
Proof. See Appendix.
As noted, the key result is that m is larger in all cases where the market is aﬀected
by piracy than when it is not. Still, the quantitative diﬀerences between cases (ii) to
13(v) will be of interest when discussing policy alternatives in Section 4. Thus, it is useful
to brieﬂy discuss which cases may be most relevant. Since casual observation indicates
that the work of most artists is copied, it seems that the most relevant case is the one
initially analyzed (Subsection 2.2). Still, the case where only superstars are copied may
be of particular interest. Superstars’ work is more likely to be copied, not only because
their originals tend to be more expensive but also because their larger market makes
their work more easily available in P2P networks. But more importantly in the case of
the music industry, revenues from records (as opposed to revenues from concerts) are
relatively more signiﬁcant for superstars than for young and niche artists. There is an
important reason for this: the economies of scale of joint consumption that give rise
to the superstar phenomenon have a limit for live performances but have no limits for
records. In fact, the main goal of superstars’ concert tours, at least until the advent
of the Internet, was to promote new records. This is not the case for niche and young
artists, some of who are willing to provide records on the Internet even for free as a
way to become popular and increase demand for their live performances (see Peitz and
Waelbroeck, 2004).17 The model can account for these circumstances by means of a
reinterpretation. In the simplest reinterpretation, it can be assumed that consumption
of high-type artists’ work consists of buying or copying records, as before, whereas
consumption of low-type artists’ work consists of attending live performances. (Now,
i nt h ec a s eo fl o w - t y p ea r t i s t s ,y represents concert ticket sales and c represents the
marginal cost of using a venue with one more seat). Under this interpretation, which
emphasizes the diﬀerent origin of the main source of revenues for each group of artists,
only superstars can be copied. Results for case (iii) are then the most interesting ones.
17At any rate, the importance of live performances is increasing for all types of artists. For example,
according to the Music Managers Forum —a trade group in London— musicians derived two-thirds
of their income in 2000 via record labels, with the other one-third coming from concert tours and
merchandise. In 2007, this proportion had been reversed. Still, consumers’ total expenditure on
music seems to be roughly the same. According to some concert promoters, music lovers seem to
have a mental budget to spend on music and have switched their spending from CDs to tickets and
merchandising (see The Economist, July 5th 2007). This suggests that our assumption of a constant
consumers’ budget in the artistic market may be a reasonable approximation even when the nature
of the good being bought changes from recorded music to concerts.
143 Piracy and Artistic Creation in the Long Run
In this Section, we endogenize the number of high-type artists and analyze the long
run consequences of piracy on artistic creation. We take a dynamic artistic-career
perspective: young artists may or may not be talented, but their talent and charisma
is unknown when they enter the artistic market. After some period in the market, only
a fraction of them show talent and become superstars.18
3.1 A Model of Overlapping Generations of Artists
We consider an overlapping-generations extension of MacDonald’s (1988) model of
artistic markets. This extension is similar to the one in Alcalá and González-Maestre
(2008). They key diﬀerence is that here we introduce piracy and consumer heterogene-
ity. Artists live for two periods. Every period, there is an inﬁnite pool of potential
young artists among the population. Young artists are talented with probability ρ,b u t
neither they nor artistic promotion ﬁrms can observe this characteristic until after they
complete a period as active artists in the market. Individuals entering the artistic pro-
fession do so in their ﬁrst period of life as young artists. Only the fraction ρ of young
a r t i s t st h a tr e v e a lt h e m s e l v e sa st a l e n t e di nt h i sﬁrst period continue the artistic career
in their second life period as high-type artists and receive advertising. Non-talented
a r t i s t sd r o po u tf r o mt h ea r t i s t i cm a r k e t . 19
18Some economists have raised doubts about superstars necessarily having above average talent (see
for example Adler 1985). If superstars do not have more talent than the average artist, the arguments
in this paper can be simpliﬁed and the results are reinforced. In fact, our short run static model would
suﬃce to show that piracy increases overall artistic creation since there is no distinction between high-
and low-quality creation.
19The details of the process of how artists with heterogeneous and unknown talent are sorted by the
market through an information accumulation process are analyzed in MacDonald (1988). Assuming
that future performance is correlated with past performance, MacDonald shows that individuals enter
the artistic career only when young (i.e., the ﬁrst life period), and remain in the artistic market for the
second period if and only if they receive a good review of their performance in the ﬁrst period. If this
happens, their performances in the second life-period are attended by a larger number of consumers
who pay higher prices (i.e., the artist becomes a superstar). Our setting is intended as a reduced form
of this process.
15Thus, every period, the artistic market looks as it did in Section 2, except that low-
type artists are now only interpreted as young artists and that the number of high-type
artist at time t, nt,i sg i v e nb y :
nt = ρmt−1. (11)
Every period, new potential young artists decide whether to enter the artistic market
(in which case they create an artistic good) or to stay out, in which case they earn






yj − F l =0 .20
3.2 The Long Run Impact of Piracy
3.2.1 The case where all artists are copied
As in the previous section, we ﬁrst compare the case of no piracy with the case where
all artists are copied in equilibrium, which occurs if pc <p l and pc <p h.
Consider an economy where copying is not possible. Substituting with (11) in







ss is the steady state number of high-type artists if there is no piracy. In turn,











20Potential artists’ decision to enter the artistic career may depend on lifelong expected utility of
starting an artistic career. This involves taking into account ﬁrst-period earnings as well as expected
discounted second-period earnings (which include the possibility of succeeding and becoming a su-
perstar). Alcalá and González-Maestre (2008) analyze the decission to start an artistic career in this
case. They show that, as long as the time discount factor and the probability of becoming a star are
suﬃciently low (or that young artists are liquidity constrained), second life-period earnings can be ig-
nored for the qualitative results of the model. This is the simplifying approach we adopt in this paper.
They also show that, from the young artists’ perspective, changes in the market environment that
shift revenues from superstars to young artists imply transforming future and uncertain revenues into
actual current revenues. Hence, the present discounted value of starting an artistic career increases.
16where nc
ss is the steady state number of high-type artists if all artists are pirated. Since
ρ<1,w eh a v en∗
ss <n c
ss. Thus, piracy increases the long run number of high- and low-
type artists. The intuition for the result is as in the previous section. Copying reduces
the proﬁtability of stars’ promotion costs, which therefore decrease. Consequently,
young artists enjoy a larger market share and their number rises. Since the number of
talented high-type artists in the long run depends on the abundance of young artists
in previous periods, this increases the long run number of high-type artists. The lower
ρ is, the larger the ratio nc
ss/n∗
ss is, since a lower fraction of talented artists involves
the need for a larger number of young artists trying the artistic career.
Note that neither pc nor c aﬀect nc
ss. The reason is that they induce two opposing
eﬀects which cancel each other out. On the one hand, higher c/pc ratio tends to increase
the price of originals with respect to irregular copies and increases the fraction of
consumers buying irregular copies. This lowers the incentives for superstars’ promotion
expenditures thereby increasing young artists’ market share. On the other hand, higher
c/pc also has a negative eﬀect on young artists’ revenues per unit of sales. These two
eﬀects cancel each other out when pc <p l.
As with the analysis for the short run, this analysis is conditional on superstars
being able to cover their opportunity costs; i.e., πh ≥ 0. The important point now
is to note that superstars can indeed obtain rents in the long run equilibrium, even
if there is free entry to the artistic career as a young artist. Superstars may obtain
rents because there is no free entry to the status of superstar. In order to become a
superstar, artists must go through a young-artist period and show their talent. But
the market for young artists is limited. In fact, it is more limited the more resources
superstars spend on their promotion. Superstars’ promotion expenditures may create
a bottleneck to access the superstar status.
Still, piracy might in principle reduce superstars’ revenues so as to hit the constraint
πh ≥ 0. Thus, we may want to explicitly consider this constraint in the analysis. To
do so, note that for every pc there is a maximum number of high-type artists that
can obtain non-negative proﬁts (given the parameters of the market). That is, for
every pc there is an n such that πh(pc,n)=0 . Using (8) and (9), which correspond to


























This schedule is drawn in Figure 2. The pairs satisfying the constraint πh(pc,n) ≥ 0
are those in or below the schedule: higher pc involves less copies, so that the market
can support a larger number of superstars. Points (pc,n) that are strictly below this
schedule imply πh
ss > 0; i.e., superstars obtain rents. Depending on the value of
the parameters in (14) such as S/Fh, this schedule may cross the m(pc) schedule at
diﬀerent points. Our analysis above is conditional on this crossing being to the left
of the relevant value of pc. This hypothesis does not seem to be inconsistent with
available data on superstars earnings.
The following proposition summarizes the main point in this section.
Proposition 3 In the long run, if high-type artists obtain rents and all artists are
pirated, piracy increases the number of low- as well as high-type artists.
3.2.2 Considering all cases
The Appendix considers all possible cases of pc with respect to pl and ph.I tt u r n so u t
that the long run number of high-type artists is a continuous function of pc,d e n o t e d
as nss(pc). Figure 2 draws this function. Results are summarized in the following:
Proposition 4 In the long run, if high-type artists obtain rents, piracy increases the
number of low- as well as high-type artists. Moreover, the number of both types of artists
is constant as a function of pc for both small and large pc, increasing for intermediate-
low values of pc and decreasing for intermediate-large values of pc. The maximum level
of both types of artists is reached when pc equals the critical level pl such that below
that level, low-type artists are not aﬀected by piracy.
Proof. See Appendix.
Thus, nss follows the same pattern, as a function of pc,a sm(pc).A g a i n , a s i n
Section 2, diﬀerences between cases (ii) to (v) do not aﬀect our key result that piracy
always leads to a larger number of artists. Notwithstanding, these diﬀerences are of
some interest when discussing policy alternatives in the next section.
184 Taxes and Levies on Copying Equipment: Help-
ing Artistic Creation?
As noted in the Introduction, in most European countries, the policy response to
ﬁle sharing and copying has been to implement levies on recording equipment and
electronic devices such as CDs, DVDs, hard discs, and MP3s. Then, most revenues
from these levies are allocated among writers, performers, and copyright holders in
proportion to their legal sales. In this Section we discuss the implications on artistic
creation of these and other alternative policies. In order to analyze the impact of
diﬀerent policy alternatives, it is useful to think about copy levies as involving two
separated policies: a tax on copy equipment and a subsidy to artists. We ﬁrst discuss
the impact of diﬀerent copy taxes and then discuss the impact of diﬀerent schemes
for allocating tax revenues across artists. As in the rest of the paper, the analysis
is conducted assuming that high-type artists obtain rents. When the diﬀerent cases
outlined in the previous sections lead here to diﬀerent results, we focus on the case
where all artists are copied and on the case where only superstars are copied since
these are the two most relevant cases according to the discussion at the end of Section
2.
4.1 Taxes on Copy Equipment
Note ﬁrst that taxes on copy equipment may or may not be proportional to the amount
of the material being copied. For example, levies on CDs and DVDs may be roughly
proportional to the amount of copying. In contrast, levies on electronic devices such as
MP3 players and last-generation cell phones, are not. Levies on electronic devices are
rather a ﬁxed cost on copying. We must therefore distinguish between proportional copy
taxes (e.g., taxes on CDs and DVDs) and ﬁxed copy taxes with respect to the amount
of copying (e.g., taxes on MP3 players, cell phones, and the like). These two policy
alternatives can easily be mapped in terms of the model in this paper. A proportional
copy tax is equivalent to a rise in pc. In turn, a ﬁxed tax is equivalent to a reduction
in the amount S to be spent on artistic goods.
19According to expressions (10) and (13), which are valid for the case where all
artists are copied, larger consumer expenditure S increases m and nss.T h e s a m e
occurs for cases (ii) − (vi) (see expressions (A.1), (A.3) and (A.4), and (A.5)-(A.7) in
the Appendix). Therefore, given the equivalence between policies and the parameters
in the model, ﬁxed taxes on electronic devices reduce m and nss. On the other hand,
Figures 1 and 2 show that a small increase in pc ( w h i c h ,a sw en o t e d ,i se q u i v a l e n t
to implementing a proportional copy tax) has no eﬀect on m and nss when all artists
are copied. The reason is the same one underlying previous results: these taxes have
t w oo p p o s i n ge ﬀects on low-type artists’ revenues —a positive eﬀect on low-type artists’
earnings given their market share and a negative eﬀect due to a market share loss
in favor of superstars. However, when only superstars are aﬀected by copying (i.e.,
for ph >p c > pl in Figures 1 and 2), a proportional copy tax (which is equivalent to
increasing pc) has a negative eﬀect on m and nss. The following proposition summarizes
these results.
Proposition 5 Fixed taxes on electronic devices reduce the short run number of niche
and young artists, as well as the long run number of high-type artists. If only superstars
are aﬀected by copying, proportional copy taxes also have a negative impact on the short
run number of niche and young artists and the long run number of all artists.
4.2 Allocating the Revenues from Copy Levies
T h ea l l o c a t i o no fl e v yr e v e n u e sa c r o s sa r t i s t sm a yo rm a yn o tb ei np r o p o r t i o nt o
their legal sales. For example, niche and young artists could receive a share of levy
revenues larger than their share of sales. We will distinguish between a proportional-
to-sales allocation of levy revenues (revenues are allocated across artists in proportion
to their legal sales) and a lump-sum allocation (artists receive a ﬁxed amount that is
independent of their sales). Clearly, there may be many intermediate policies involving
revenue allocations that are non-linear in sales, which would be roughly equivalent to
a combination of these two policies.
Again, these two policy alternatives can easily be mapped in terms of the model
in this paper. A lump-sum allocation of levy revenues across artists is equivalent to
20a reduction in artists’ opportunity costs Fh and F l. In the case where all artists are
copied, expressions (10) and (13) show that higher F l decreases m and nss.T h e r e f o r e ,
lump-sum payments to artists increase m and nss. The same occurs for cases (ii)−(vi)
(see expressions (A.1), (A.3) and (A.4), and (A.5)-(A.7) in the Appendix). On the
other hand, a proportional allocation of levy revenues across artists is equivalent to a
subsidy that reduces the cost c of each original reproduction. Now, note that wherever
pc or c enter the expressions determining the number of artists, they enter them as
ar a t i oc/pc. Hence, a proportional-to-sales payment to artists has the same eﬀect as
a proportional copy tax. Hence, the same analysis carried out for proportional copy
taxes (see the second part of Proposition 5) holds for proportional-to-sales allocations
of levy returns. Summarizing, we have the following
Proposition 6 Allocating the revenues from levies as lump-sum payments to artists
increases the short run number of niche and young artists as well as the long run
number of high-type artists. However, allocating the revenues from levies across artists
in proportion to their legal sales may reduce the short and the long run number of
artists. This will in fact be the case if only superstars are aﬀected by copying.
Propositions 5 and 6 warn about the risks for artistic creation of a policy based
on levies that are allocated according to legal sales. These policies may only favor
superstars. If superstars obtain rents, copying may favor young and niche artists in the
short run, and all sorts of artistic creation in the long run. Taxes on copying material
may hamper this eﬀect. Moreover, if levy revenues are allocated in proportion to sales
of records, they raise the incentives to invest in the promotion of superstars, potentially
oﬀsetting the Internet’s market-concentration loosening eﬀect.21
Proposition 6 suggests that the most eﬀective policy from the point of view of
artistic creation would be to use the yields from levies to help young artists. Of course,
21Also note that, in principle, levies have the characteristic that total revenues being collected equal
total payments to the beneﬁciaries of the levy. Hence, the total amount of resources allocated to the
artistic industry remains constant. However, if not all the equipment subject to copy levies is used for
copying artistic material, then copy levies involve a transfer of resources from the rest of the economy
to the artistic industry. In such a case, levies with proportional-to-sales allocation of revenues may
involve a subsidy to superstars from the rest of the economy.
21any lump-sum-like scheme for allocating levy revenues should make sure that artists
a r ei n d e e da c t i v e .T h i sm a yr e q u i r ec o n d i t i o n i n gp a y m e n t so ns o m em i n i m u mo u t p u t
in terms of sales or live performances. Non-linear strongly concave schemes linking levy
payments received by artists to their sales may also constitute an intermediate useful
compromise between strictly proportional schemes and lump-sum schemes. Moreover,
resources allocated to young artists need not to be implemented as direct payments but
can also take the form of subsidizing young artists’ productions and live performances
or reducing general taxes on them.22
5 Concluding Comments
New communication and copy technologies are aﬀecting artistic industries in many
ways. This paper focuses on the eﬀects in a setting that emphasizes three central as-
pects of artistic markets: the predominance of superstars, the importance of promotion
expenditures, and the dynamics of talent sorting. Under reasonable conditions, we ﬁnd
that piracy may lower superstars’ incentives to spend on promotion, which makes entry
and survival by niche and young artists easier. As a consequence, the number of artists
and therefore artistic diversity may increase. Moreover, talented artists can only be
sorted by the market after a period in the long tail as a young artist. Therefore, by
giving more market opportunities to young and niche artists, piracy may also enhance
high quality creation in the long run. It follows that it cannot be taken for granted
that copy levies recently implemented in many Western countries, whose revenues are
mostly allocated in proportion to sales, will favor artistic creation. These levies on
copy equipment and other possible restrictive policies may reinforce the already strong
market position of top artists.
In general, the aim of optimal copyright protection is to ﬁnd the right balance
between underutilization of ideas caused by intellectual property rights, and underpro-
vision of ideas that results from lack of appropriation of beneﬁts by creators. However,
22For related literature discussing alternative mechanisms to ﬁnance creation that may be more
eﬃcient than granting monopoly rights, see for example Shavell and van Ypersele (2001), and Romer
(2002).
22this trade-oﬀ does not necessarily arise in artistic markets if most revenues accrue to
a reduced number of creators (superstars) that obtain rents. In such a case, higher
protection of copyrights may increase both underutilization and, in the long run, un-
derprovision. The reason is that stronger copyright protection may provide too many
incentives for superstar business, thereby choking the development of new artistic ca-
reers that are the long run source of ideas.
As noted throughout the paper, our results are conditional on the premise that su-
perstars obtain rents. Is this hypothesis reasonable? Many people may ﬁnd it obvious
that this is the case. However, economists are rightly skeptical of anything taken as
given. Our model shows that superstars can indeed obtain rents in the long run equi-
librium. Moreover, we cite empirical evidence that is consistent with this hypothesis.
Still, more detailed data on the distribution of artists earnings would be useful. Col-
lecting societies do not readily share data on the distribution of copyright earnings. It
would seem reasonable that at least the statistics on the allocation of copy levy yields
across artists and copyright holders were made public, since collecting societies now
beneﬁt from the legislative and administrative capacities of governments to implement
the levies. This information would help assess how skewed the distribution of payments
is in favor of a small amount of superstars and how reasonable the hypothesis is that
superstars obtain rents.
During the last century, technological progress in communication and recording
devices (such as radio, TV, records, tapes, etc.) greatly concentrated some artistic
markets in favor of fewer top artists who obtained increasingly larger revenues. This
process may not be over, as some recent changes in the economic and political environ-
ment are facilitating the globalization of culture, thereby increasing cultural uniformity
and favoring further concentration. However, new communication and copy technolo-
gies may have a counterbalancing eﬀect. Borrowing Tom Friedman’s (2005) metaphor,
new communication and copy technologies are ﬂattening the artistic market by leveling
it in favor of the long tail of young and niche artists. Governments should make sure
that policies intended to favor artistic creation do not hinder this process.
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P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
A se x p l a i n e di nt h em a i nt e x t ,t h e r ea r eﬁve possible cases depending on the ex-
ogenous level of pc:23
(i) p
c > ph : copies are blockaded;
(ii) ph ≥ p
c ≥ p
h : superstars deter copies;
(iii) p
h >p
c > pl : only superstars are copied;
(iv) pl ≥ p
c ≥ p
l : low-type artists deter copies and superstars are copied;
(v) p
l >p
c : both low-type artists and superstars are copied.
Case (i):
This case was analyzed in Section 2.1, yielding expression (6) for m.N o t et h a ti n
this case, m does not depend on pc.
Case (ii):
In this case, we have ph = pc. Hence, proﬁts of each high-type artist at Stage 1 of
t h eg a m ea r eπh
i =
pc−c
npc aS − Ai − F h.T h eﬁrst order conditions of the SPNE of the
game yield:
βe−γnA/S(pc − c)




Then, the number of low-type artists is given by the free entry condition, which com-










Note that this is decreasing in pc. Also note that for pc = n
n−1c, expressions (6) and
(A.1) yield the same value for m,s ot h a tm is continuous as a function of pc at the
frontier between cases (i)a n d( ii).
Case (iii)
23As already noted in the main text, for ph ≯ pl t h ea n a l y s i si ss o m e w h a ts i m p l e rs i n c ec a s e( iii)i s
replaced by a diﬀerent case where both high- and low-type artists ﬁx the same price pc,t h e r e b yb o t h
groups of artists deterring copies.
24In this case, we have ph = 2n
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c −Ai −F h.W ec a nr e w r i t e









−γnA/S) − Ai − F
h,i =1 ,2,...,n.
The ﬁrst order conditions for the SPNE of the game yield the new SPNE level for a,













Using this expression and the free-entry condition in the low-type market yields the












Note that m is decreasing in pc. Also note that equations (A.1) and (A.3) yield the
same number of low-type artists for pc = 2n
2n−1c ,s ot h a tm is continuous as a function
of pc at the frontier between cases (ii)a n d( iii).
Case (iv)
In this case the equilibrium price in the low-type market is pl = pc. Hence proﬁts




(pc − c)(1 − a)S
mpc − F
l =0 .










Since c/pc >c / p h =( 2 n − 1)/2n>1/2, it is easily seen that m is increasing in pc.
Moreover, m takes the same value for pc = m
m−1c when using expressions (A.3) and
(A.4), so that m is continuous at the frontier between cases (iii)a n d( iv).
Case (v)
This case was already considered in the main text, yielding expression (10) for m.
Moreover, m t a k e st h es a m ev a l u ef o rpc = 2m
2m−1c when using expressions (A.4) and
(10), so that m is continuous at the frontier between cases (iv)a n d( v).
25The overall relationship between pc and m is illustrated in Figure 1, where the curve
m(pc) represents the equilibrium level of m as a function of the copying price. Note
that m(pc) reaches a maximum at point p0 = pl, at the frontier between region (iii)
and (iv).
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4
In the long run, the steady state value of n as a function of pc can be obtained
by using (11) to substitute into expressions (4), (A.1), (A.3), (A.4), and (10), which
correspond, respectively, to cases (i)-(v) considered in the previous short run analysis.
Cases (i)a n d( v) were already analyzed in the main text, yielding expressions (12) and
























Recall from the main text that n is independent of pc in cases (i)a n d( v). Now, it
is easy to see that n is decreasing in pc in cases (ii)a n d( iii) ,w h e r e a si ti si n c r e a s i n gi n
case (iv). Hence, nss as a function of pc follows the same pattern as m(pc) (see Figures
1 and 2), with a maximum at the frontier between regions (iii)a n d ( iv).
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29Table 1: CopyTaxes in some European countries in 2009
Amount of compensation set by Government Turkey
- 0.22 per GB 9.66/27.20 0.23 0.03 Switzerland
- 13.00/27.90 0.08/27.90 0.25 0.06 Sweden
0.3 3.40 3.15 0.44 0.17 Spain
- - - 0.14 0.05 Portugal
Annual compensation set by Government Norway
- - - 0.60 0.14 The Netherlands
- 1.42 1.42 0.28 0.14 Latvia
- 3% 3% 0.58 0.25 Italy
- 9.21 2.56 0.174 0.0288 Germany
0.072/0.944 5.00/50.00 1.00/20.00 1.00 0.35 France
- 4.00/21.00 4.00/21.00 0.60 0.20 Finland
0.62 - - 0.44 0.28 Denmark
- 3% - 0.59 0.12 Belgium
- 9.00/22.50 3.00/9.00 0.54 0.34 Austria
Memory card Hard disk DVD-
recorder
Mp3 player DVD Data
CD-r
Country
Tariffs on Devices Tariffs on Blank Carriers
Note: Figures are in Euros except when percentage (%) is indicated, which refers to a percentage on the sale price. When an interval 
is shown, the exact levy depends on GB of memory.
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Figure 1: The short run number of low-type artists.
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Figure 2: The long run number of high-type artists.
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